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Abstract
In recent years the number of IoT devices in home networks
has increased dramatically. Whenever a new device connects
to the network, it must be quickly managed and secured using
the relevant security mechanism or QoS policy. Thus a key
challenge is to distinguish between IoT and NoT devices in a
matter of minutes. Unfortunately, there is no clear indication
of whether a device in a network is an IoT. In this paper, we
propose different classifiers that identify a device as IoT or
non-IoT, in a short time scale, and with high accuracy.
Our classifiers were constructed using machine learning
techniques on a seen (training) dataset and were tested on an
unseen (test) dataset. They successfully classified devices that
were not in the seen dataset with accuracy above 95%. The
first classifier is a logistic regression classifier based on traffic
features. The second classifier is based on features we retrieve
from DHCP packets. Finally, we present a unified classifier
that leverages the advantages of the other two classifiers. We
focus on the home-network environment, but our classifiers
are also applicable to enterprise networks.
I. INTRODUCTION
The number of IoT devices in home network has increased
dramatically in recent years. IoT devices are much more
vulnerable to attacks than general-purpose endpoint computers
and will be insecure in the foreseeable future. In most cases,
the IoT device is strong enough to host an attacking zombie but
too weak to protect itself from malicious code. Thus, it clearly
poses new security challenges. Attacks on IoTs have severe
implications in both the cyber and physical domains [6], [39],
[37], [20]. There are many proposed security and management
solutions, with the common practice being a network-based
solution that is geared to protecting IoT devices and resides at
the home router [2], [12] or in an additional security device
designed to protect the home network [9], [5], [7], [4]. The
security solution cannot reside in the IoT device itself, due to
the low CPU power and memory of IoT.
Whenever a new device connects to the network, it must be
managed and secured as quickly as possible using the relevant
security policy. A key challenge is thus to quickly distinguish
between IoT (smart camera, bulbs, speakers and so on) and
non-IoT devices( general purpose computers, mobile phones,
desktops, tablets and laptops and so on), referred to in our
paper as NoT devices. We assume that the classification is
done in a device that observes the LAN traffic. Our paper
focuses on IoTs that are actual physical entities connected
to the internet. Classification of borderline devices such as
smartTVs (that can be used to surf the Internet and to run
different applications) is part of our future work.
In this paper, we propose three classifiers for identifying
devices as IoT or NoT (see a summary of results in Table
I). We use a machine learning methodology, where we trained
classifiers on the seen dataset of labeled (IoT or NoT) devices,
and then analyze the accuracy of our classifiers on an unseen
dataset of devices. The unseen dataset includes IoT device
types that were not in the seen dataset. This challenging
requirement is due to the huge variety of IoT devices, types
and vendors. Moreover, the IoT market is very dynamic,
with new vendors and new devices appearing constantly. We
therefore seek a general classifier: one that identifies the
inherent characteristics of IoT vs NoT devices.
The desired classification approach should have the follow-
ing properties:
• Universality - the classifier should be generic and work
for all IoT device types, including those with encrypted
traffic. It should also work on device types it has not yet
seen.
• Low classification latency - We consider 1 to 20 minute
latency.
• Accuracy - the classifier should be accurate. We use F1-
score, recall and precision as measures for accuracy.
• Efficient - the classifier should also be efficient, with low
CPU processing and memory requirements, since it needs
to process on-line traffic.
• Passiveness - the classifier should passively process the
traffic and may not use active probing of devices. Active
techniques are usually tailored for specific IoT devices
and/or require special permission from the owner. More-
over, in some cases, active probing might unintentionally
activate the devices.
The first classifier, presented in Section IV, is a logistic
regression classifier using traffic features. The resulting clas-
sifier is efficient and requires light processing on a few features
of the traffic (up to 5). We found the most informative features
to be the TCP window size and the number of unique DNS
queries. We show that these features were chosen by our ML
algorithm because of the very limited number of endpoints
with which IoT devices communicate, as well as their small
TCP buffer size.
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Classifier Classification Latency F1-Score Recall Precision Efficiency
Classifier I: Traffic Features 1 min 91.54% 97.38% 87.02% Counters
5 min 96.59% 98.72% 94.54% Counters
10 min 98.12% 98.91% 97.34% Counters
20 min 98.07% 98.71% 97.43% Counters
Classifier II: DHCP Long 95.73% 93.75% 97.82% DPI required
Classifier III: Unified 20 min 99.04% 98.11% 100% DPI required
TABLE I
EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS OF THE PRESENTED CLASSIFIERS OVER THE UNSEEN DATASET
The second classifier, presented in Section V, is based on
a decision tree on DHCP information. The DHCP protocol is
very common in home networks, and the resulting decision
tree is simple (with a height smaller than 5). The downside
of the algorithm is that not all the networks or devices use
DHCP. Moreover, it might have a long classification latency,
since DHCP appears relatively seldom in the traffic.
We then present in Section VI a unified classifier that
leverages the advantages of the other two above classifiers and
achieves F-score, precision and recall above 98. The unified
classifier can be found in our github repository [1].
The closest work to ours is the recent published work,
DeviceMien [30], where the authors also note the blind spot
in the literature in categorizing as IoT previously unseen IoT
devices. However we achieve better accuracy, and we also
provide a clear intuition behind the features and signatures
selected by our classifiers (see Section II). Thus, our work
sheds light on the unique network characteristics of IoT
devices.
II. RELATED WORK
A technique that uses user-agent field information was
suggested in [27] to classify IoT devices. A user-agent value is
sent during HTTP requests, and it contains a short description
of the properties of the requesting device. For NoT devices,
this parameter is usually of greater length, since it describes
properties relevant only for NoT devices, such as screen size,
OS language and browser. However, we discovered that the
technique does not meet our requirements. The user-agent
parameter cannot be observed in encrypted traffic. In our
dataset, only 69.5% of devices transmit this parameter as a
plain text, and a similar result was shown in [23]. Moreover
classification latency is high - the chance to find an user-agent
value sent by an IoT device in a slot of 20 minutes is about
25%. We note that unlike the DHCP client information, the
user- agent is information that was sent to the endpoints, and
hence it is not stored at the home-router and thus cannot be
actively retrieved.
MAC OUI can be helpful in identifying the manufacturer of
a device. But is of very limited use as a unique identifier of IoT
due to manufacturers that supply both IoT and non-IoT device
types (such as Samsung’s smartcam and smartphones). The
authors of [26] tried to associate MAC ranges of manufacturers
with models, but their technique was often ineffective due to
lack of regularization in this field.
Other works address related areas, such as device finger-
printing [34], [19], [27], [28], but IoT devices that were not
seen before cannot be identified by these techniques.
The authors of [18] propose a proactive request to IoT
devices in order to classify the exact IoT vendor/model
device. However, this work does not meet our passiveness
requirement, since sending packets to IoT requires non-trivial
permissions.
OS fingerprinting is addressed in [22], [21], [23]; however,
the device type cannot be easily identified from the resulting
OS information. The Satori project [22], [21] inspired our use
of some of the features we tested in this work, mostly data
from the IP-TCP layers.
The closest work to ours is DeviceMien [30], where the
authors also note the blind spot in the literature in categorizing
as IoT previously unseen IoT devices. Their approach, which
uses auto-encoder, a deep-learning technique, cannot provide
any intuition regarding the received classifier, in contrast to
our approach. We also achieve better accuracy: F1-score of
above 95% on ours dataset, as opposed to 76% by the authors
of [30] on theirs. Since they did not publish the dataset or
their resulting classifier, we cannot compare our techniques
on the same dataset. However, they did provide a list of the
devices in the dataset, which are very similar to our. We
note that they also checked a few borderline IoT devices,
such as SmartTVs. We predict, based on the list of devices,
that we would achieved an F1-score of 92% on their dataset,
assuming misclassification in the borderline IoT devices. We
suspect that our superior results due to the ability of machine
learning techniques such as the one we used to achieve good
results on small datasets. Deep learning techniques, on the
other hand, require huge datasets, which are difficult to obtain
due to the need to label the devices. Another advantage of
our classifiers is that they latency is time-bound. Finally, our
implementation is more efficient since they require only a few
memory references.
We note that a recent initiative calls for IoT device vendors
to provide a Manufacturer Usage Description (MUD) for their
IoT products [24], which as a by-product identifies the device
as an IoT. Only a very few IoTs currently provide MUD files. It
is moreover questionable whether the majority of the vendors
would comply with MUD, since the vendor apathy is one of
the root causes of the IoT security problems.
III. METHODOLOGY
Our dataset is composed of captured network traffic data
(pcap files), recorded at the router or at an access point, of
labeled devices from various sources: [34], [32] , [33], [8],
[14] and pcaps collected from our IoT lab. The IoT devices
in our dataset are unique by type, model and/or OS version.
Overall we had about 46GB of data. Recording time varied
greatly, with some devices that were recorded for weeks and
some for hours. Overall, our dataset contained 121 devices:
77 IoT and 44 NoT devices.
At first, we arbitrarily split the dataset into two groups:
seen and unseen. Later on, we gained access to more devices,
and we added them to the unseen dataset. Our seen group
contained 45 devices, 24 IoT and 21 NoT (see Table V in
Appendix). Our unseen group contained 76 devices, 53 IoT
devices and 23 NoT (see Table VI in Appendix).
As the names indicate, we performed the learning on the
seen group and tested our classifiers on the unseen group. We
want to emphasis that the samples of the unseen group were
not available to us during the learning phase.
In order to test classification performance in various time
periods, we divided our dataset into time slots of 1, 5, 10
and 20 minutes. Working with a model of slots, our classifiers
process information of a time slot (in the training phase and
testing phase). Slots with a small number of packets were
also considered, since we observed that they might contain
sufficient information for classification. Some devices were
characterized by their very rare network usage, such as the
Nest Smoke Alarm, which sends only a few packets every 23
hours. Thus, our classifier can classify a device as soon as it
sends data.
Our goal is to classify a new device in a network as being
IoT or NoT. This goal of dichotomy classification is a choice
we made. We could also have used a scoring mechanism,
estimating the probability of being in one of the classes, or
classification to three categories: IoT or NoT or Undecidable.
The dichotomy classification fits well with our need to always
decide how to protect and manage the device, as a general
purpose computer or as an IoT device.
In our model, an IoT device is considered ’Positive’, and
a NoT device is considered ’Negative’. We thus defined the
following performance metrics: True Positive (TP) - correct
classification of an IoT device; False Positive (FP) - misclas-
sification of a non-IoT (NoT) device as IoT True Negative
(TN) - correct classification of a non-IoT (NoT) device; False
Negative (FN) - misclassification of an IoT device as non-IoT
(NoT).
We measure the accuracy using recall, precision and F1-
Score: Recall is the probability of an actual IoT to be
successfully classified as such, i.e., TPTP+FN . Precision is the
probability that an IoT-classified device is truly an IoT, i.e.,
TP
TP+FP . F1-score is a unified performance index defined as
2 · recall·precisionrecall+precision .
IV. CLASSIFIER ON TRAFFIC FEATURES
In this section, we propose a logistic regression classifier
that operates on traffic features. We start by explaining the
two-step learning phase (see Section IV-A), which consists
of a feature selection followed by constructing an optimized
feature set. We then explain the intuition behind the selected
features in Section IV-B. In Section IV-C we present the testing
phase results that demonstrate its accuracy on the unseen data
set. We then discuss some implementation considerations (in
Section IV-D).
A. Learning phase
1) Feature Selection: We tested 22 features from standard
protocols (Link-Layer, IP, TCP, DNS, HTTP) (see Table II).
We tested every feature that we thought might be an indicator.
We then automatically selected from among them a small set
of ten informative features that achieved an F1-score above
0.5 for the seen dataset (see Table III). The feature selection
was done as follows: the seen data traffic was first divided into
sets of IoT or NoT. For each feature, we analyzed those sets
(IoT vs. NoT) using statistical tools (Welch’s t-test, ROC curve
and AUC calculation [38], [17]) to determine the separation
potential for each feature. We narrowed our feature set to the
best performing features. Then, we normalized the seen traffic,
such that each device had the same number of samples. This
helped us deal with the big differences in recording time,
where some devices were recorded for weeks and some for
hours. In order to represent a wide range of scenarios, we
chose representative samples according to bandwidth (low,
medium and high).
We calculated the F1-score using 5-fold cross-validation,
a common technique in machine learning, to choose features
with no over-fitting. Our 5-fold cross-validation method ran-
domly splits the devices in the dataset into 5 independent sets
of train (80%) and test (20%). Note that no device appears
in more than one test set. Every test was run 5 times, once
for each fold, and the results were averaged. We ran this test
separately for every classification latency.
For feature information that appears only from time to
time in the traffic (e.g., TCP timestamp or user-agent), we
filled slots with missing values with the average values of the
feature, as learned from the seen dataset. Therefore, a low F1-
score may also indicate that this feature does not appear in
most slots.
2) Constructing an Optimized Feature Set: Our classifier
uses sklearn’s StandardScaler function [11] in order to stan-
dardize feature values and relies on the logistic regression
algorithm [31] when applying classification. In order to test
incoming traffic against the classifier, we again imputed any
missing value from an average we learned for each feature.
Later on, we used logistic regression on the standardized
values in order to get a classification result.
In constructing a machine learning model, we chose a
combination of features that optimizes prediction rates, for
each classification latency separately. We applied our learning
using 5-fold cross-validation, as proposed in Section IV-A1
Layer Feature description
Link-Layer Number of outgoing packets
Link-Layer Bandwidth (in bytes) of outgoing traffic
Link-Layer Average (in bytes) of packets length
Link-Layer Average of interleaving time for outgoing packets
Link-Layer Standard deviation of interleaving time for outgoing packets
IP Number of unique interacted endpoints of remote IPs
IP Average of the TTL value in outgoing IP packets
IP Average of the header length value in outgoing IP packets
IP Maximum of the header length value in outgoing IP packets
IP Minimum of the header length value in outgoing IP packets
IP Count of unique header length values in outgoing IP packets
IP Number of unique outgoing ports
IP Ratio between the number of TCP to UDP packets
IP Number of unique interacted endpoints of remote End-Points (IP × Ports)
TCP Maximum TCP window size
TCP Mean TCP window size
TCP Minimum TCP window size
TCP Count of unique TCP window size values
TCP Linear-least-square error for TCP timestamp value
DNS Number of unique DNS queries
DNS Number of DNS queries
HTTP Average length of user-agent field in http requests
TABLE II
LIST OF RAW FEATURES TESTED.
Fig. 1. The values of maximum TCP window size in IoT devices (presented as
CDF) and NoT devices (presented as Reverse-CDF), seen dataset, 10-minute
time slot.
To learn the optimal number of features and the optimal
features themselves, we used a greedy algorithm. Our goal
was not only to optimize the F1-score for each classification
latency but also the number of selected features. We used a
parameter α (set to 1%) as a threshold in order to prefer a
smaller vector size over a larger one with a tiny performance
gain (less than α). Table IV shows the optimal combinations
Fig. 2. The number of unique DNS queries in IoT devices (presented as
CDF) and NoT devices (presented as Reverse-CDF), seen dataset, 10-minute
time slot.
and their averaged F1-score over the 5-fold cross-validation
for each classification latency (on the seen dataset).
B. Intuition
We then tried to understand the reason behind the dominant
selected features: window size and number of unique DNS
requests. We noticed that IoT device hardware is not as well
Feature name Feature description F1-score
window size maximum TCP window size 0.942
# unique DNS reqs number of unique DNS queries 0.845
# remote IPs number of unique interacted endpoints of remote IPs 0.829
# dns reqs number of DNS queries 0.738
# ports number of unique outgoing ports 0.658
bandwidth bandwidth (in bytes) of outgoing traffic 0.601
pckt count number of outgoing packets 0.588
tcp ts deviation linear-least-square error for TCP timestamp value 0.582
interleaving deviations standard deviation of interleaving time for outgoing packets 0.576
tcp/udp ratio ratio between the number of TCP to UDP packets 0.548
TABLE III
LIST OF FEATURES WITH F1-SCORE ABOVE 0.5 (SEEN DATASET, TIME SLOT OF 10 MINUTES).
Classification Latency F1-Score Feature set
1 min 89.52% window size, # unique DNS reqs, tcp/udp ratio, pckt count
5 min 95.41% window size, # unique DNS reqs, # remote IPs
10 min 96.33% window size, # unique DNS reqs, # remote IPs, interleaving deviations
20 min 96.48% window size, # unique DNS reqs, # remote IPs
TABLE IV
BEST FEATURE SETS FOR EACH CLASSIFICATION LATENCY WITH THE F1-SCORE OVER CROSS-VALIDATION DATA (SEEN DATASET)
equipped as NoT devices hardware, and have small buffer
size for TCP stack and therefore commonly has a smaller
TCP window size [16]. Figure 1 compares the CDF of the
IoT window size values to the reverse-CDF of the NoT
window size values. This comparison shows the separability
over this feature. This feature is highly available, visible and
unencrypted. All of our devices had TCP traffic in their time
slots.
In addition, IoT devices connects to limited endpoints
(mostly vendor cloud servers), and thus have fewer unique
DNS requests, remote IPs and ports (a similar observation
was made in [34]). Figure 2 compares the CDF of the number
of unique DNS queries of IoT devices to the reverse-CDF for
NoT devices. Note that if there is no DNS traffic, this is also
data, and the value of the feature for that slot will be zero.
The classifiers that work on time-slots from 5 minutes and
above used the number of unique remote IPs in addition to
the number of the unique DNS requests. We suspect that these
numbers differ since we capture the traffic in some slots, i.e.,
in the middle of the device operation, we might not capture the
DNS queries that resolve the IPs. Thus the number of unique
remote IPs adds information.
C. Testing phase
After training our models, we validated the classifiers
against the unseen dataset (see Table I). Again, we considered
all the time-slots and average the results per device. We
received a good F1-score (91.54%) for 1 minute time slot and
very high F1-scores (above 96.5%) from 5 minutes time slot
and above.
In Figure 3 we present the CDF of the classification
success rate, defined as the fraction of time-slots, with correct
classification of a device. For a given class classification
success rate x, the graph shows the fraction of devices with a
successful classification rate smaller than or equal to x. Except
for one device, all the inconsistently classified devices were
classified in more than 82% of the time slots in the same
correct way. The most inconsistent devices were NoT devices,
such as Apple iPAD, Samsung Android, Win 10 and Win 7.
Devices are incorrectly classified when the window size is not
informative enough, and the NoT device is not very active
in that time slot. To improve the results for these cases, we
present in the next section, a classifier that works on the DHCP
information. This result also motivated us to test a classifier
with longer classification latency that uses the majority in
a sequence of time slots. This observation is applied in our
unified classifier (see Section VI).
D. Implementation Considerations
Performance wise, implementing the classifier on traffic
features requires finding the number of distinct elements
efficiently (e.g., of the number of unique DNS queries and
the number of remote IPs). Note, however, that if the number
of distinct elements, denoted by x, is small, the naive solution
would be to store the last x + 1 unique elements seen.
In our retrieved classifier the threshold of the number of
unique elements was small (less than 15), and hence this is a
practical solution. Another possible implementation is to apply
algorithms that approximate the number of distinct elements,
as was done in [36], [15], [25].
Fig. 3. CDF of classification success rate of devices, classifier on traffic
features, 10 minute time-slot, unseen dataset.
Fig. 4. Interleaving time distribution of DHCP packets on the seen dataset
V. DHCP BASED CLASSIFIER
In this section, we present a decision tree based on DHCP
information. For devices that are configured to use the DHCP,
IoT and NoT devices use the protocol to notify the router of
their existence in the network with some information about
the device.
The DHCP classifier has some inherent drawbacks: First,
DHCP packets are not available in certain network configu-
rations such as static-IP and in some IPv6 networks due to
SLAAC (stateless address auto-configuration [29]). Second,
classification requires the use of DPI, which is costly in terms
of CPU. Third, DHCP packets are sparsely available, since
DHCP traffic occurs when a device connects to the network
or renews its IP. Figure 4 represents the interleaving time
distribution. The median between consecutive DHCP packets
is about 3 hours in our dataset.
Nonetheless, on DHCP enabled networks, this can be
overcome and DHCP packets can be retrieved instantly, if
active requests can be taken. We can actively disconnect all
devices in the network (for example, by running the aireplay-
ng tool[3]). This action causes every device to renegotiate and
triggers DHCP traffic, and hence we can retrieve the DHCP
information in less than three seconds. With the appropriate
credentials, it might be possible to use tr-69 [35] (the common
protocol that is used by ISPs to manage and operate the home-
routers) to retrieve the required values from the router. 1
In the next sections, we explain the learning phase of the
decision tree on DHCP information, the intuition behind the
retrieved tree, the testing results on the unseen data, and some
implementation considerations.
A. Learning Phase
In order to construct the classifier automatically, we col-
lected all possible information from DHCP packets, obtained
from five fields: hostname, vendor-class ID (vci), parameter-
request-list (prl), maximum-dhcp-size and message-types. We
created a list of labels (words/values/numeric values) using
the following algorithm: For the hostname and vci fields,
which contain concatenations of words, we extract labels by
splitting those values into labels separated by delimiters (such
as ,./ -+), while filtering numbers. For the parameter-request-
list, which is a list of identifiers, we add the identifiers as
labels. For maximum-dhcp-size and message-type, which have
numerical values, we add the numerical values as labels. We
then construct a binary vector according to those labels for
each device. Every i-th bit in a vector represents the fact that
the i-th label exists.
We trained a decision tree model [10] using vectors we
constructed according to the seen dataset. We obtained a
simple decision tree (see Figure 5). Fortunately, due to the
plurality of devices in the seen dataset, this tree was generic
and did not receive any specific vendor IoT information.
B. Intuition
The chosen tree uses parameter-request-list (prl) informa-
tion, which is a list of parameters the device requests from
the DHCP server. We saw two dominant values: the first is
the hostname value (tag number 12), which indicates that the
device wants its hostname to be assigned by the DHCP server.
In our dataset, only IoT devices request it. The second is the
domain name value (15), which is used primarily to support
easy access to other LAN entities using domain names instead
of IP addresses. This value is mainly relevant for NoT devices.
The decision tree also uses vendor-class ID (vci) informa-
tion. The vci field mostly contains an information about the
type of DHCP client of the device. Some of our IoTs use vci
values of SOC (system on chip). We observed a number of
other prominent values with high potential, such as ’udhcp’
- a lightweight dhcp client (common for IoT), as opposed to
’dhcpcd’ - a featureful dhcp client. However, the prl values
were more prominent and were chosen by the algorithm.
We note that the hostname field is the device’s name and
it usually contains a value configured by the vendor (but can
be changed by the user). Note that the decision tree did not
1Hostname and vci are mandatory in TR-69, other DHCP values are
optional in TR69.
choose to use this information, we suspect since there are too
many possible IoT vendors and NoT vendors.
C. Testing Phase
We tested our model on the unseen dataset and achieved an
F1-score of 95.7% on devices that use DHCP (see Table I).
The incorrectly classified devices were Harmon Kardon Invok,
RENPHO Humidifier, Ubuntu PC and Homepod of Apple.
We note that the NoT devices from [32] were configured
with a static IP, and thus the technique cannot be applied to
them. These devices comprised 10% of our unseen dataset.
We classified the devices according to their DHCP packet (one
packet is enough), regardless of the classification latency (i.e.,
without division to time-slots). Thus, the classification latency
might be long, if no active request to the router is allowed.
We tried to utilize also a random forest algorithm and achieved
only slightly better results.
D. Implementation Consideration
Implementing the DHCP classifier required light deep
packet inspection, since the required information is in very
specific locations, only in the DHCP packets, so that analyzing
one such packet is sufficient. Thus, the DPI would require only
very few memory references using known DPI algorithms [13].
Fig. 5. Decision tree visualization for DHCP -based classifier.
VI. UNIFIED CLASSIFIER
As mentioned, the DHCP information is not always avail-
able, but the traffic features classifier is inaccurate for some
of the NoT devices in time-slots where the devices are not
very active, and when tcp window size information is not
inductive enough. Hence, we created a unified classifier using
the traffic features classifier on different time slots and the
DHCP classifier to improve accuracy.
The unified classifier was heuristically created. We focused
on a classification time of 20 minutes. For 20 minutes we
checked four 5-minute traffic feature classifiers, two 10-minute
classifiers, and one 20-minute classifier. Then we combined
Fig. 6. CDF of a classification success rate of devices, unified classifier, 20
minute time-slot, unseen dataset.
the classifying results based on traffic features with the DHCP
classifier result, and weighted the result as two classifiers if
DHCP information exists (as a tie breaker). We classified
according to the majority (of nine classifiers). The unified
approach slightly improves the accuracy, acheiving an F1-
score of 99.04; see Table I for comparison. We present in
Figure 6 the analysis of the classification success rate per
device.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we show that it is possible to classify devices
as IoT or NoT with short classification latency using simple
and efficient classifiers. Understanding whether a device is IoT
or NoT is crucial for visibility and security. Our classifiers are
able to classify devices that were not seen in the learning
phase. This is an important property of our classifier, since
there are no datasets that can cover the huge variety of devices,
especially IoT devices. A key benefit of our classifiers is that
we can explain the intuition behind the learned classifiers. The
unified classifier code was published in our github repository
[1], for use and comparative study by the community.
A limitation of our research is that we did not focus on
borderline IoT devices (such as Android TV and Echo Show).
A further study should be performed on the ability to identify
this borderline category.
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Category Device Name
NoT
Samsung Galaxy Tab
Android Phone
Windows Laptop
MacBook
Android Phone
IPhone
MacBook/Iphone
Lg Smartphone
Nexus 5x Smartphone
Apple Macbook
Xiaomi Smartphone
Laptop win10
Macbook
Macbook
Samsung s7
Xiaomi mi5
Galaxy-A7-2017 Smartphone
Lenovo Win10 laptop
LG G3 Smartphone
Asus ZenPad Tablet
Dell Win7 laptop
IoT
Smart Things
Netatmo Welcome
TP-Link Day Night camera
Samsung SmartCam
Dropcam
Insteon Camera, wifi
Insteon Camera, wired
Withings Smart Monitor
Belkin Wemo switch
TP-Link Smart plug
iHome
Belkin wemo motion sensor
NEST Protect smoke alarm
Netatmo weather station
Withings Smart scale
Blipcare Blood Pressure meter
Withings Aura smart sensor
LiFX Smart Bulb
Triby Speaker Smart Speaker
PIX-STAR Photo-frame
HP Printer
Nest Dropcam
Chromecast Streamer
Yeelink Smart Light Bulb
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VIII. APPENDIX
Category Device Name
NoT
Samsung s5 Smartphone
Android samsung
Apple iPhone
Windows Laptop
Ubuntu PC
Apple ipad
xiaomi A2
Dell Laptop win 10
Mac laptop
Xiaomi smartphone
VM Win 8.1 64B
VM Win 7 Pro 64B
VM Ubuntu 16.4 64B
VM Win 10 pro 32B
VM Ubuntu 16.4 32B
VM Ubuntu 14.4 64B
VM Ubuntu 14.4 32B
Macbook
VM Testbed09 (windows)
VM Testbed13 (windows)
iPad
Iphone
Android Tablet
IoT
2X Amazone Echo
Apple HomePod
August Doorbell Cam
Belkin Netcam
Belkin WeMo Link
Bezeq smarthome
Bose SoundTouch 10
Canary
Caseta Wireless Hub
Chamberlain myQ Garage Opener
Chinese Webcam
D-Link DCS-5009L Camera
Foscam
Google Home
3X Google Home Mini
Google OnHub
Harmon Kardon Invoke
Insteon Hub
iRobot
Koogeek Lightbulb
lifiLab
Logitech Harmony Hub
Logitech Logi Circle
MiCasaVerde VeraLite
2X Motorola Hubble
NestCam
NestDetector
Nest Camera
Nest Cam IQ
Nest Guard
Netgear Arlo Camera
Philips HUE Hub
Piper NV
Provision ISR
RENPHO Humidifier
Ring Doorbell
Roku 4
Roomba
samsung smart home camera
Securifi Almond
smartHub
Sonos
TP-Link Smart WiFi LED Bulb
2X TP-Link WiFi Plug
WeMo Crockpot
Wink 2 Hub
Withings Home
Wyze Cam
TABLE VI
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